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In many policy processes nowadays a variety of actors is involved which results in 
complex decision making processes, since these different actors have various 
perspectives on the problem and the matching solutions. Such complex processes are 
difficult to grasp in short reports in newspapers or on television, especially since 
journalists have to deal with increasing time pressures and demands to make news 
items more entertaining. This leads to biases in the construction of the policy processes. 
In this study we examine whether the biases of fragmentization, dramatization, 
personalization, the authority-disorder bias and the negativity bias can be found in 
media reporting on complex decision making processes in the Netherlands.  
We conducted a quantitative content analysis on media reports on five complex water 
management projects in the Netherlands. We found that in these media reports stories 
are often fragmentized, dramatized and unfavourably towards the project, and 
frequently an authority is blamed for not taking appropriates measures. Certain actors 
take advantage of these biases more than other actors: media attention for oppositional 
politicians and interest groups in particular relate significantly to the media biases.  
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1. Media biases and the construction of controversial policy processes 
Much decision making nowadays takes place in governance networks: a variety of actors 
is involved in the policy making processes. In these governance networks there is no 
consensus about the problem or solution and there is much uncertainty around the 
knowledge on these (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Hisschemöller & Hoppe, 1995; Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004). The different actors involved in the policy process have dissimilar 
interests; as a result, many perspectives on the problem and solution exist. Because 
these policy problems are contested, often they will be publicly discussed in media. In 
public administration much attention is paid to the decision making processes, but not 
to the construction of those processes in media.  
Is the discussion in media representative for the complex decision making processes? 
We argue that the especially the complexity of these decision making processes conflicts 
with news reporting practices. Bennett (2009) describes 4 information biases in the 
current news reporting, based on research of Patterson (2000). The news is more 
personalized, dramatized, fragmentized and there is an authority-disorder bias in the 
news (Bennett, 2009). In short, the biased news story gets a human face, reveals a lot of 
conflict, doesn’t discuss the context of the issue and claims action is needed from an 
authority to solve the problem. The following fragment from a media report in our study 
is illustrative (Brabants Dagblad, August 24, 2004) on the case of Noordwaard: “When 
the touring car comes closer, the excitement increases within a small group of people on 
the corner of Steurgat-Galeiweg-Kooike in Werkendam. One of those people is Adri 
Vermeu, who just positioned his tractor with trailer across the road. (…) The touring car 
[with the Minister for Transport] has to stop. Vermeu wants to make clear to her that 
not everybody is happy with the plans in this region.(…) Sacrificing the region for water 
management purposes means the end of practically all twenty agricultural businesses in 
that area.” The disagreement of the farmer with the project plans leads to a conflict 
situation, which point to the personal drama of the twenty agricultural businesses and 
plea for action of the minister. 
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The biases stem from time pressures journalists experience and the competition for the 
attention of the news consumer (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001; Davis, 2007; Bennett, 
2009). As a consequence, wicked policy issues will be simplified and enlivened by these 
biases: complex decision making will be a source of infotainment. In addition, the 
distribution of media attention for the stakeholders will be unbalanced as certain actors’ 
behavior does fit to the information biases better than others’. We argue that especially 
the behavior of opponents as oppositional politicians and interest groups matches with 
the framing of infotainment.  
 
Research questions and relevance 
In this study, we examine the media reporting in newspapers and on television about 
five important water management projects in the Netherlands, which can be 
characterized as wicked problems (van Buuren, Edelenbos & Klijn, 2010). Firstly, we 
want to know to what extent the information biases in media framing exist in reports on 
the water management policies. We, secondly, investigate how the biases in the news 
relate to the coverage of the involved actors. 
In communication studies, media studies and political science, quite some research has 
been done on these news biases. However, most of this research concerns more general 
trends in media reporting (Patterson, 1993, 2000; Bennett, 2009) or is connected to 
elections (Brants & Neijens, 1998; Brants & van Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof 
and Oegema, 2006). Yet, in this study we are interested in the media coverage of long 
term complex policy processes: we focus on ten years of media reporting on five 
comparable projects, in which various public, semi-public and private actors are 
involved.  
It is important to research the news around policies because the increase of 
infotainment has consequences for the information citizens get out of the news. 
McChesney (2000) even argues that the media have become an anti-democratic force 
because of the above described developments: the commercialized media do value 
entertained news consumers more than informed citizens.  
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In our study, we also explicitly link the infotainment biases to the coverage of certain 
actors, which is a new application of the theory around the information biases. This 
investigation may lead to questions around the empowerment of certain actors in the 
media and in democracy by the information biases. After all, we know that media can 
affect issues on the political and policy agenda in the form of agenda setting (Cobb and 
Elder 1983, Baumgartner, Jones, & Leech 1997, Cook et al. 1983, McCombs 2004) and 
framing (Scheufele 1999, Fisher 2003). Thus, media attention can be an important 
source of power, especially for outsiders.  
 
Paper outline 
This paper is organized as follows. We start with an elaboration on wicked problems in 
section 2.1. Afterwards, we discuss the media biases in section 2.2. At the end of the 
theoretical part of this paper we link these two, by developing hypotheses on the 
construction of complex decision making processes in media reports in section 2.3. In 
the third section we pay attention to our data collection (section 3.1), our method of 
analysis (section 3.2) and the conceptualization (section 3.3). Next, we present our 
analysis, by first discussing the existence of the biases in the media coverage of the 
water management policies (section 4.1) and secondly we relate these biases to the 
oppositional politicians and interest groups in the policy processes (section 4.2).  Lastly, 
we report our main conclusions based on our findings, in section 5.  
 
2. Theory: wicked problems in the media 
2.1 Wicked problems 
Many policy problems can be characterized as “wicked” problems (Rittel & Webber, 
1973; Mason & Mitroff, 1981; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Wicked problems can be 
contrasted to tame problems. Tame problems can be defined with the knowledge 
available; moreover, there is consensus towards the solution. On the contrary, wicked 
problems are ill-defined and solutions to the problem rely on negotiation between 
different actors.  Planning problems are a good example. 
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As a result, wicked problems particularly differ from other policy problems with regard 
to the high level of uncertainty surrounding these policy issues. Koppenjan & Klijn 
(2004) distinguish three sources of uncertainty: the substantive uncertainty, the 
strategic uncertainty and the institutional uncertainty. Substantively, a final formulation 
of a problem is not possible and one true solution does not exist (Rittel & Webber, 
1973). In contrast, many involved actors see many different problems and will 
subsequently propose various solutions. Because so many actors have their own 
perceptions of the situation they will adopt different strategies to pursue their goals, 
this leads to strategic uncertainty. The interactions of the strategies lead to certain 
problem formulations and influence the problem solving process (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2004). Thirdly, wicked problems can be typified by institutional uncertainty. Because the 
policy issues are often played out in a network with people from different organizations, 
administrative levels and other networks, the interaction between actors is even more 
complex. The interaction of actors will be partly restricted by the different institutional 
regimes of the involved actors and also other networks.  
These wicked problems have implications for policy making. There must be a broader 
participation of affected parties, directly and indirectly, in the policy-making process 
(Mason & Mitroff, 1981: 13). A network structure is therefore a better structure to 
facilitate the interactions between the different involved actors, than, for instance, top-
down-structures (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Weber & Khademian, 2008). In networks the 
interactions between actors are more horizontally organized, while the 
interdependencies between actors are leading. In governance networks cooperation 
between all kinds of actors takes place, such as governmental institutions, interest 
groups or private enterprises. A high level of conflict exists in the networks, because 
there is little agreement between the actors with regard to the problem or solution 
(Weber & Khademian, 2008). Policy games between these actors are played out: the 
conflicting views and interests are negotiated to come to policy measures. When actors 
are open for the contribution of other actors, this will lead to processes of reframing 
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and learning, and innovative solutions can be discovered subsequently (Schön & Rein, 
1994; Hischemöller & Hoppe, 1995; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
All things considered, the policy making process in networks is very complex in nature. 
When journalists have to report on issues around these decision making processes, they 
must reduce this complexity, because the item must be comprehensible and fit within 
the limit of words or minutes journalists have to work with. Moreover, the current 
competition between the various media outlets has led to more information biases in 
the news reporting.  
 
2.2 Information biases 
News outlets stand under enormous pressures nowadays. Especially print media in 
general (except for the free newspapers) see a decrease in printing and coverage ratio in 
the Netherlands (CvdM, 2005). This decreasing trend is also noticed in other countries in 
Europe and in the US (McChesney, 2000; Davis, 2007; Aldridge, 2007: 29), due to high 
competition. This competition between the different outlets is related to the increase in 
the number of media outlets on television and on the Internet. In reaction, (print) media 
have to become more efficient, and several measures are therefore taken. One of these 
measures is that publishers are clustered together in larger conglomerates. On the 
regional level in the Netherlands for instance, this has led to more daily press 
monopolies and fewer television broadcasters (Vergeer, 2006). Besides this, journalists 
have to deal with rising daily pressures as a consequence of the competition (Davis, 
2008: 43). They have to work more efficiently: in less time they need to work on more 
news items. At the same time, news items need to attract enough news consumers to 
be able to compete for advertisers among all other media outlets. Both the time 
pressure on the journalist and the competition for the news consumers lead to more 
infotainment around us (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001; Davis, 2007; Bennett, 2009). 
News items contain more entertainment value, on the one hand to simplify a complex 
story; on the other hand to make the story more attractive.  
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Several studies conclude that currently certain trends in the reporting exist. Stories 
simplify and liven up the complex reality, by their focus on conflicts or individual drama. 
Bennett (2009: 40), for a large part based on research by Patterson (2000), describes 
four biases in the construction of reality by media: the personalization bias, the 
dramatization bias, the fragmentization bias and the authority disorder bias. Besides 
this, Patterson (2000) sees a bias towards negativity in the news. These trends in the 
framing of news can also be found in other studies on media content (Brants & Neijens, 
1998; Patterson, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Brants & van Praag, 2006; Iyengar 
& McGrady, 2007; Strömback & Sheheta, 2007; Bennett, 2009).  
The personalization bias refers to the framing of stories in human interest stories. It 
brings a human face or emotional angle to the presentation of an issue (Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000; Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009). This media preference for 
personalized human-interest news creates a “can’t-see-the-forest-for-the-trees” 
information bias, argues Bennett (2009: 41): it makes it difficult to see the actual 
institutional picture that lies beyond the actors who are caught in the eye of the news 
camera. The personal story does hardly ever contain a more in-depth analysis of the 
case.  
The second bias, the dramatization bias, is the emphasis on crisis and conflict in stories 
rather than on continuity and harmony (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009). News dramas 
downplay complex policy information, the workings of government institutions, and the 
bases of power behind the central characters (Bennett, 2009: 41). Journalists tend to 
describe the situation at hand in terms of conflicts, with winners and losers (Brants & 
Neijens, 1998; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Brants & van Praag, 2006; Strömback & 
Sheheta, 2007).  
Thirdly, the isolation of stories from each other and from their larger context is called 
the fragmentization bias (Valkenburg & Semetko, 2000; Patterson, 2000; Iyengar & 
McGrady, 2007; Strömback & Sheheta, 2007; Bennett, 2009: 42). In this ‘episodic’ 
framing journalists describe issues in terms of specific events; they do not place them in 
their more general context (Iyengar & McGrady, 2007).  
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Fourthly, the news is preoccupied with order, as journalists question whether 
authorities are capable of establishing or restoring the order (Semetko & Valkenburg, 
2000; Bennett, 2009: 43). This bias in the framing of news is known as the authority-
disorder bias. At the same time, the attitude of media towards authorities is shifted 
from a more favourable stance towards an attitude where media are more suspicious to 
authorities (Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof and Oegema 2006; Bennett, 2009).  
Furthermore, the news tends to be more negative in general. The majority of the 
American public perceives the news as “depressing” and “negative” (Patterson 2000). 
However, Brants en van Praag did not find an increase in cynical tone in the 
Netherlands, studying the content of media reports in general from 1986 till 2003. 
These biases indicate the increase of infotainment in media reporting (Brants & Neijens, 
1998; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Patterson, 2000; Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001; 
Bennett, 2009).  
 
2.3 A biased journalistic construction of complex decision making processes 
Altheide (2004: 294) argues that given the time pressure, an orientation on 
infotainment is quite useful for journalists to cover a complex event which involves 
various facets and numerous possible interpretations. News dramas can simplify and 
enliven the complex policy processes. In the same line of argument, Davis (2007) claims 
that wicked policy processes are either avoided by journalists, or drastically reshaped to 
fit the journalistic norms.  
We can typify the water management projects under study as complex projects, 
encountering wicked problems. Many actors are involved in these projects, including 
mandated and oppositional politicians from local, regional and national government, 
interest groups, Water Boards, private investors and research institutes. All these actors 
have different perspectives on the case, which makes the process complex. Hence, we 
expect biases media reports on these complex water management policies. Our first 
hypothesis reads therefore as follows: 
I. The media reports on the water management policies contain the following information biases: 
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a. the personalization bias; b. the dramatization bias; c. the fragmentization bias; d. authority 
disorder-bias; e. negativity bias. 
 
Not only do we expect these biases in the news around complex decision making 
processes, but we also think these biases are more related to certain actors within the 
networks. The biases have an important influence on who will get access to the public 
and how those actors’ public images are formed (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). They 
consequently lead to a selection of certain perspectives on the wicked problems by 
media, and thus a biased framing of the complex issue. We foresee positive relations 
between the biases and oppositional politicians and with the interest groups in 
particular. The behaviour of these groups of actors fit the biases better than other 
groups of actors. The media are at the same time likely to be a rather more important 
source of power for outsider than for insider groups (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1993; Sireau and Davis, 2007: 135). 
 
Information biases and the oppositional politicians 
Politicians and journalists need each other in the news cycle: politicians need publicity 
on their stand points and journalists need news issues about politics. More and more 
politicians are advised by communication professionals to strategically postulate their 
statements in order to receive media attention. Political actors therefore adapt more 
and more to the needs of media with regard to timing, location, and the framing of the 
message so it becomes newsworthy (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Kepplinger, 2002; 
Schulz, 2004; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). This has led to the “spectularization” of political 
communication formats and of the political discourse itself (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999: 
251). Politicians increasingly speak in sound bites (Strömback & Dimitrova, 2011), catchy 
phrases which fit in the limited space politicians get in media. An example of such a 
sound bite of an oppositional politician in one of our cases (IJsseldelta-Zuid) is: “For the 
umpteenth time we witness a showcase project of politicians which costs hundreds of 
millions of public funds” (in Nieuw Kamper Dagblad, 12 September 2009). This sound 
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bite fits to the information biases really well. It contains conflict (dramatization bias), 
because it assaults policies of politicians. Besides this, it generates feelings of 
outrageousness: it talks about the loss of public funds, which connects easily with the 
personalization bias. Thirdly, it berates the political action by claiming the project is not 
valuable for the general public but only for the politician himself, this forms a part of the 
disorder-authority bias. Negativity dominates; the project is framed as a mere 
showcase, which costs a lot of public money.  
Oppositional politicians in particular need media attention to change the problems on 
the agenda, so we predict that reports on them will be more biased than reports on 
other actors, which is stated in hypotheses II.  
II. Media attention for oppositional politicians is positively related to the information biases. 
 
Information biases and interest groups 
Interest groups also need media attention in order to be heard by other actors. In this 
study, interest groups can be roughly divided in three categories: interest groups of 
citizens of the concerned region, interest groups of farmers and interest groups with 
concerns for the environment or the landscape. To get publicity these interest groups 
pursue the same strategies that oppositional politicians use for making and shaping the 
news (Iyengar & McGrady, 2007). Terkildsen, Schnell and Ling (1998: 45) found that the 
success in structuring issue information is often more related to journalistic norms than 
to actual pressure group strength. Important media-imposed criteria that influence this 
success are spokesperson accessibility, rules of issue simplicity, drama and event-
oriented coverage (Terkildsen, Schnell, Ling, 1998: 58). Interest groups not only make 
use of bold statements, they also organize actions against policies. Such a protest is not 
successful unless it is covered by media (Lipsky, 1986). For instance, in the case of 
Wieringerrandmeer farmers went to the building of the Provincial Council on their 
tractors with banners with protesting slogans. This event suits the information biases 
well. The protest is an indication of a conflict between the farmers and the Provincial 
Council, so this fits in the dramatization bias. Moreover, the protest makes it possible to 
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give the issue a human face (personalization bias). A quote from a report from Trouw 
(18 march 2008) illustrates this: “Van Loon is ‘inwardly mad’, because he cannot make a 
living out of only half of his company. `Good solutions need to be developed, otherwise 
they have a problem` he says determined. It is quiet for a while. `Or we have`, he 
continues.” It is clear that the protest is directed to the authorities of the Provincial 
Council, which suits the authority-disorder bias. The negativity bias is also fed. Hence, 
journalists will report on these protest events.  
Although for the interest groups mainly personal interests are at stake and not their 
public image – as is more the case for the politicians – they also need the media to 
pursue their goals. Hence, we predict that the reports on interest groups are also more 
related to the information biases than the reports about other actors.   
III. Media attention for interest groups is positively related to the information biases. 
 
The data and methods we used to tests these hypotheses are described in the following 
section on methodology.  
 
3. Methodology 
 3.1. Data: five water management cases 
To examine the role of information biases in the construction of wicked problems we 
studied the media reports on five water management cases (IJsseldelta-Zuid, Lent, 
Noordwaard, Wieringerrandmeer and Zuidplaspolder) in the Netherlands. These cases 
have been studied extensively with regard to the decision making processes (Van 
Buuren, Edelenbos & Klijn, 2010), which is useful for the interpretation of the results of 
this study. In all cases actors deal with water management issues, preventing areas 
against floods. The task of water management is in all cases combined with more 
planning activities such as housing, the development of recreational areas or 
infrastructure, which makes these cases complex projects. Decision making on these 
projects takes place with many different actors – public as well as private – which have 
different perspectives. Besides this, the knowledge on the issues is limited and 
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contested. Van Buuren et al. (2010:16) therefore characterize the water management 
issues as wicked problems.  
The media reports about those projects stem from newspapers and television. Although 
there are more different media outlets, the norms of media overall, such as standard of 
newsworthiness, are highly similar among media outlets (Strömback & Dimitrova, 2011: 
33). The selection of news paper reports started at the database of Lexis Nexis Academic 
NL. We searched for media reports in the period of 1 January 2000 till 1 January 2011 
with the name of the case1 as the search term. A disadvantage of the database of Lexis 
Nexis Academic NL is that not all regional newspapers can be found from 2000 on. For 
instance, in the database the reporting in the selected newspapers for 
Wieringerrandmeer started even in 2007. This may lead to small biases in the material. 
Reports are decided to belong to the universe (population of media reports) only when 
more than one paragraph2 was written on the concerned water management project. 
When the universe of media reports comprised more than 150 items, we took a random 
sample per project3. Besides these news paper reports, we searched for television items 
about the water management projects at the website from the Dutch institute for 
television and radio (http://portal.beeldengeluid.nl/) and on the websites of regional 
broadcasters. We did not sample the television items, because of their small amount. 
This resulted in a sample of 556 media reports. Out of these media reports, 59 reports 
come from national news media (10,6%), while 497 reports stem from regional media 
(89,4%). Besides this, most news about the projects is written down in newspapers: 520 
reports stemmed from daily papers (93,5%) against 36 items from television programs4 
(6,5%).   
                                                 
1 “IJsseldelta-Zuid”, “dijkteruglegging Lent”, “Noordwaard”, “Wieringerrandmeer” and “Zuidplaspolder” 
2 Or when the report itself was just one paragraph: when the report was written about the water 
management project.  
3 In between 150 and 300 reports: the sample consists of the first of every two reports; in between 300 
and 450 reports: the sample consists of the first of every three reports; in between 450 and 600 reports: 
the sample consists of the first of every four reports, etcetera.  
4 However, we must remark that it is quite recent that regional television programs can be found on the 
Internet. The earliest item of regional television is from March 2006, and the date regional broadcasters 
started their broadcasting on the Internet may even differ per outlet. This may lead to small biases in the 
analysis.  
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 3.2. Method: Quantitative content analysis 
For each media report an established coding scheme was used to typify the report. Five 
teams of trained coders executed the coding of the news reports, with the help of an 
extensive coding instruction. We executed two tests of reliability in and in between 
these teams. We used conformity tests to test the reliability of coded data. When the 
conformity is 0,90 or higher this will lead to a reliability score above 0,80 on all types of 
reliability measures (Wester & van Selm, 2006). On the one hand, the stability of the 
coders is tested. The stability of the coders is on average 0,94, this indicates a generally 
high stability. On the other hand the inter-coder reliability is tested, his agreement is 
averagely 0,90. Hence, we conclude this data set can be seen as reliable: there is not 
much ‘noise’ hampering accurate statistical analysis on these data.   
However, it is not only important that coders agree on codes. The coding must also be 
valid. We therefore based the coding scheme mainly on items from the coding system of 
Patterson (2000), and used his instructions. We especially used the codes which 
represented the biases Bennett (2009) later on denominates. Besides these codes, we 
developed an item in which the most important actor in the report was identified. The 
categories of this item (23 actors in total) were based on the case study research (van 
Buuren et al., 2010). In the statistical analysis we derived dummies from this variable. 
We elaborate on the conceptualization behind the codes in the following subsection.  
 
 3.3 Conceptualization 
Although the biases in the news are differently conceptualized in different studies we 
use the coding scheme of Patterson, because it is more complete than much other 
studies which have a more fragmented focus on certain biases (see for instance Brants 
& Neijens, 1998; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Brants & van Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis, 
van Hoof and Oegema 2006; Strömback & Sheheta, 2007). Moreover, the codes of 
Patterson (2000) can be easily translated to the biases Bennett (2009) describes. 
Patterson (2000) conceptualizes human interest framing in several aspects. Human 
interest stories use a human example or put a “human face” on an issue or problem or 
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go into the private or personal life of an actor (Patterson: 2000: 25). Another 
characteristic of a human interest frame is that the journalist employs adjectives or 
personal vignettes that generate feelings of sympathy, empathy or outrage. As 
Patterson (2000), we use a four-item scale from ‘high human interest content’ till ‘no 
human interest content’. We recoded the item to get an increasing ordinal scale.  
The extent to which a journalist dramatizes his report can be measured by the item of 
the amount of conflict the story contains. The conflict frame is based on the way the 
story is presented, not on the topic of the story (Patterson, 2000). There are three 
categories: substantial level of conflict; some conflict (not merely incidental) and no 
conflict (or so slight as to be inconsequential). We also recoded this item to get an 
increasing ordinal scale.  
Another bias in media records is the ignorance of the context of the story (Patterson, 
2000; Bennett, 2009). In an episodic frame the story is mainly described in the context 
of a particular event only; the story does not go much beyond that specific event. In 
contrast, in a thematic frame, the story itself is mainly placed in a broader context that 
deals with its meaning or implications for society or describes a trend that goes beyond 
this single event: the story places the issue in a broad or abstract context (Patterson, 
2000:25).  
The fourth bias, the authority-disorder bias, can be conceptualized by the action frame 
(Patterson, 2000). When the story implies there is a need for action or suggests action 
should be taken the action frame is present. We combined this item with another code: 
the attribution of responsibility. Who/what needs to take the action or is responsible for 
the issue? Categories of Patterson (2000: 25) are: not applicable (no action frame 
present); government; a group, or collective, or community in society or private 
institution; private individual. When the story implies a need for action and the 
government is given the responsibility for that, the authority-disorder bias is present.  
In addition to the four categories of Bennett (2009) we use negativity as a fifth bias. 
There are 6 categories used to typify the main tenor of the report: clearly negative/ 
unfavorable; more negative or unfavorable than positive or favorable; balanced mix 
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between negative and positive; more positive or favorable than negative or 
unfavorable; clearly positive/ favorable; neutral story, no positive or negative 
(Patterson, 2000: 25-26). To simplify this, we added the sixth category to the third. For 
this research we coded whether the report was favorable or unfavorable towards the 
water management project.  
 
4. Biases in the media coverage of the water management projects 
4.1 Biases in the news 
Using the above described items from the coding scheme of Patterson (2000), we 
examined to what extent the biases are present in the media reports on the concerning 
water management projects. We sum up the frequencies below: 
- Fragmentization bias. We see this bias clearly in the media reports around the complex 
projects. In only 21,6% of the items the story is placed in a broader context, while in 
78,4% the story does not go much beyond the specific event.  
- Dramatization. Also the dramatization bias can be found in the reporting under study. 
Most of the media records contain a certain amount of conflict: 33,1% encloses a 
substantial level of conflict, 30,9% of the reports encloses some conflict. Somewhat 
more than a third (36,0%) of the media reports about the water management projects 
are not framed in conflicts at all.  
- Personalization bias. However, in our data set most of the reports are not personalized 
at all (54,5%). Only 11,0% of the stories are highly personalized and 12,2% of the media 
messages is moderately personalized. The remaining 22,3% of the media reports 
contains only slight human interest content. Thus, the personalization bias does not 
appear often in the reporting on the water management projects.  
- Authority disorder bias. Fourthly, to what extent do the messages imply a need for 
action? In more than half (51,8%) of the media reports describe that certain aspects of 
the project plan need to be changed. Obviously, the responsibility of solving the 
problems is mostly attributed to the government, this is the case in 95,1% of the media 
reports in which is plead for change. The authority-disorder bias – so, there is a need for 
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action described for which the government is claimed to be responsible – is present in 
49,3% of all media reports. The authority-disorder bias is present in almost half of all 
media messages around the water management projects.  
- Negativity bias As the results show, the dominant attitude in the report towards the 
project was most of the times negative: we found a negative attitude towards the 
project in 48,0% of the media reports. In 32,2% the reporting was neutral. Journalists 
reported favorably about the projects in 19,8% of their reports.  
 
4.2 Actors and biases in the news 
Our next interest is how the actors and biases in the news are interconnected. Can 
statistical relations be drawn between groups of actors and the biases in the news? 
Before we describe our results on the relation of oppositional politicians and the 
interest groups with the information biases, we discuss which actors were important in 
the news reports on the water management projects.  
 
Main actors in the news 
We made different groups of actors; these groups have different interests with regard 
to media attention. The first group, mandated politicians, consists of politicians in 
leading positions on all levels of government in the Netherlands: aldermans, mayors, 
delegates from the Proviancial Executive, ministers, and the Prime Minister. The second 
group – oppositional politicians – is composed of politicians in oppositional positions on 
all levels of government: municipal councilors, provincial councilors, and Members of 
the Lower House. The third group, named as governmental institutions, comprises 
governmental layers in the Netherlands: municipality, province, the central government 
and the Water Authority. In the concerning news items is not made explicit from whom 
in the governmental institution the message is coming exactly (often it will be general 
communication from the governmental institution).  The fourth group – interest groups 
– is formed by inhabitants and farmers of the region and by environmental 
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organizations. The fifth group is the project organization. The sixth group consists of 
private investors, research institutes and other actors.  
          
As we can see in the histogram, the 
interest groups are mostly (30,1%) the 
main subject of the media reports, in 
comparison with the other groups of 
actors. The interest groups are 
followed up by the mandated 
politicians, which are in 21,4% the 
main subject of reporting. On the third 
place are the governmental 
institutions, 14,6% of the media items 
are about them. The oppositional actors are in 13,7% of the media messages the most 
important actor of the news. Only 7,8% of the media reports focuses on the project 
organization. The rest category ‘other groups of actors’ gave rise to 12,5% of the media 
messages.  
 
Oppositional politicians and the information biases 
The next step is to take a closer look at the statistical relations between the selected 
groups and the media biases. In line with out hypotheses II en III, we look at the 
statistical relations between the reporting on oppositional politicians and the 
information biases. We made dummy variables for these groups in order to be able to 
use association measures for ordinal variables. With these measures we not only get 
information on the strength of the relation, but also on the direction of the statistical 
relation. We use the Spearman’s rho, which is the most used non-parametric test for 
correlations (Field, 2009).  
We saw already that the fragmentization bias is frequently present in the reporting on 
the water management projects, but it appeared not to be linked to oppositional 
Figure 1. Media attention for the different groups of actors 
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politicians more than to other groups. In contrast, we see some media biases – 
dramatization (rs = 0,122, p < 0,01), the authority-disorder bias (rs = 0,126, p < 0,05) and 
the negativity bias (rs = -0,100, p < 0,05) – do relate to the reporting on oppositional 
politicians. However, these relations are not that strong in all cases. Moreover, we see 
an even opposite relation with the personalization bias as expected: the reports on 
oppositional politicians are slightly less personalized than reports on other actors (rs = -
0,088, p < 0,05).  
 
Table 1. Correlations between the information biases and the media attention for oppositional politicians.  




















-,033 ,148 -,096 ,098 -,205* -,014 
Dramatization ↔ 
oppositional politicians 
,122** ,234* ,158 ,142 ,152 ,193* 
Personalization ↔ 
oppositional politicians 




,126* ,060 ,212* ,169 ,119 ,059 
Tendency ↔ 
oppositional politicians 
-,100* -,291** ,015 -,206* ,044 -,100 
 
In conclusion, we cannot completely confirm hypothesis II. The media attention for 
oppositional politicians is related to the dramatization bias, the authority-disorder bias 
and the negativity bias. Though, we did not found a relation with the fragmentization 
bias and the personalization bias is even negatively related to the attention for 
oppositional politicians. 
 
Interest groups and the information biases 
Again, we see no relation between the fragmentization bias and, for now, the interest 
groups. Conversely, all the other media biases can statistically be coupled to the 
reporting on interest groups. When the news report is about interest groups, we see 
more often the personalization bias, as when other actors are in the centre of the 
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attention (rs = 0,318, p < 0,001). Also the news items on interest groups are more often 
framed as a conflict than news items on other actors, as is indicated by the Spearman’s 
rho of 0,296 (p < 0,001). In addition, reports on interest groups relate positively to the 
authority disorder-bias (rs = 0,119, p < 0,01). Furthermore, the reporting on interest 
groups tend to be more negative than the reporting on other groups of actors, as is 
demonstrated by the Spearman’s rho of -0,263 (p < 0,001).  
 
Table 2. Correlations between the information biases and the media attention for interest groups.  
*** Correlation is significant at a 0,001 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
When we look at the relations in all different cases we see the same relations between 
the biases and the media reporting on interest groups. In all cases the media reporting 
on interest groups fits more to the infotainment standard (except for the 
fragmentization bias) than reporting on other groups. Furthermore, the relations 
between the information biases and the interest groups are stronger than the 
correlations between the biases and the oppositional politicians.  
To sum up, hypothesis III is mostly confirmed: Media attention for interest groups is 
positively related to the information biases, except with regard to the fragmentization 
bias. 
 




















-,022 -,135 ,054 -,090 -,013 ,120 
Dramatization ↔ 
interest groups 
,296*** ,446*** ,202* ,257* ,336*** ,320*** 
Personalization 
 ↔ interest groups 
,318*** ,416*** ,406*** ,388*** ,253** ,235*** 
Authority-disorder 
bias↔ interest groups 
,119** ,091 ,130 ,057 ,127 ,232** 
Negativity bias ↔ 
interest groups 
-,263*** -,207* -,346*** -,226* -,235* -,365*** 
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5. Opponents in decision making are the source of infotainment 
5.1 Conclusion 
We conclude that most information biases were clearly present in the media reports on 
the water management projects in the Netherland. Many reports were fragmentized, 
dramatized and unfavourable towards the project, and many claimed for action of a 
governmental authority (authority-disorder bias). However, in only a few reports the 
personalization bias was found. Nevertheless, we conclude that complex decision 
making is often simplified and enlivened by the information biases Patterson (2000) and 
Bennett (2009) describe. Complex decision making can be a source of infotainment. 
While news consumers get to some extent entertained, reading or viewing news reports 
on water management policies, we can question at the same time to what extent they 
get really informed on the actual decision making process. After all, there is a trade-off 
between the information value and the entertainment value (McChesney, 2001).  
Furthermore, the biases have an important influence on which actors get access to the 
public: we doubt the balance of the reporting towards the different perspectives of 
actors. The biases do relate more to certain actors in the decision making process than 
to others. To some extent media attention for oppositional politicians is related to the 
information biases. However, the correlations do not hold for all cases. In complex 
policy processes politicians do not always have an equally active or inactive role in the 
decision making process around the wicked problems, in contrast with their active role 
in policies around tame problems. The information biases do correlate more 
consistently to the media attention for interest groups. The interest groups mainly seem 
to take advantage from the biases: they received the most media attention, in 
comparison to the other groups of actors. Oppositional politicians stay in that respect a 
little bit behind. The media biases seem to make it easier for outsiders – especially 
interest groups – to attract media attention. This can be an important source of power 
for them to influence the agenda or frame the issue at hand. Journalists, on the other 
side, seem to exploit the contributions of interest groups in the context of the water 
management projects. They often use the perspective of interest groups to shape their 
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storylines, which enables them to create the infotainment around the complex policy 
processes. In literature about media often the media biases and politics are linked 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Kepplinger, 2002; Schulz, 2004; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). 
We show that in complex decision making processes the link between interest groups 
and the biases is even more present.  
 
5.2 Implications for further research 
Now that we have seen that interest groups receive most media attention in 
comparison to other groups of actors, and that this is related to journalistic practices 
nowadays, we may think of the implications. It would be interesting to study the effects 
of this media attention for interest groups on their actual influence on the decision 
making process.  Are they really able to set the agenda or frame the issue in the 
governance networks?  
 
One remark on this study is that the media reports on the projects were mostly coming 
from regional media outlets. Regional media partly function under different 
mechanisms, since their audience consists of a smaller target group, formed by the 
citizens of the concerned region. This may have contributed to the abundance of media 
reports about the interest groups, which include many action groups of citizens and 
farmers out of the region. Research on complex projects which received more attention 
from national media would provide us the insight whether the relations between 
interest groups and the information biases also exist on a national level.  
Another remark concerns the type of media outlets. Interactive forums, sites as 
facebook or blogs may function with other norms, so we can not generalize our findings 
towards these interactive media.  It would be interesting for further research to see how 
in these media complex policy processes are described, which actors are active on these 
websites, and whether this has some agenda setting or framing function.  
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